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GO PHISH: CIRCUIT SPLIT IN POLICY INTERPRETATION FOR SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING FRAUD LOSSES CREATES AMBIGUITY FOR INSURERS 
AND INSUREDS 
GABRIELLA SCOTT* 
“The development of technology will leave only one problem: the 
infirmity of human nature.”1 
I. UNCHARTED WATERS: INSURERS AND COURTS HIT A SNAG IN LINE OF 
PRECEDENT WITH SOCIAL ENGINEERING FRAUD 
“I need your help with a last-minute transaction,” the email read, sent to a new 
employee in a company’s large finance department.2  The employee read on, realizing 
that the message bore the signature, company logo, and email address of her CEO.3  
Somewhat startled that she would be singled out among her peers for such an 
important task, the employee’s hand lingered over the phone to contact her 
supervisor as she read the details of the client’s financial institution and the large 
sum of money to be wired.4 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A. 2018, 
University of Kentucky.  I would like to dedicate this Comment to my family for their constant 
love and support.  I also would like to thank all of the teachers and professors who have helped 
me grow as a writer over the years; namely, Kristi Spayd, Debbie Hudson, Dr. Bruce Holle, and 
Professor Diane Pennys Edelman.  Finally, I would like to thank my friends, who have brightened 
even the toughest of law school days, and everyone on Villanova Law Review who helped with this 
Comment. 
1. KARL KRAUS, HALF-TRUTHS & ONE-AND-A-HALF TRUTHS: SELECTED APHORISMS OF 
KARL KRAUS 123 (Harry Zohn ed. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1990) (1976).  Kraus, a satirical 
Austrian writer during World War I, did not live to see the rise of world-altering technology 
intertwined with modern everyday life; yet, this pansophical statement serves as an ominous 
prediction of the manner in which computers and contemporary technology have surpassed human 
intellect and reliability in many ways.  See generally Wilma Abeles Iggers, KARL KRAUS: A VIENNESE 
CRITIC OF THE TWENTIETH CENTRY (1967). 
2. See generally David S. Wilson et al., Social Engineering Fraud in the Context of Computer and Funds 
Transfer Fraud Coverages, FIDELITY & SURETY COMM. NEWSL. (ABA, Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2016, at 13 
(describing common social engineering fraud schemes).  Although the scenario described here is 
fictional, it is indicative of a typical social engineering fraud scheme categorized as the “executive 
impersonation scam,” characterized by a spoof or similar domain email sent by a high-ranking 
individual in the company to a lower ranked employee “relating to a ‘top secret’ acquisition, merger 
or emergency situation.”  Id.  
3. See generally Kunal Pandove et al., Email Spoofing, 5 INT. J. OF COMPUT. APPLICATIONS 27, 
27–28 (2010) (describing methods used by fraudsters to send phishing emails either from 
compromised email account or those which are “spoofed” to appear as though they are sent from 
official account).  Because fraudulent emails can bear the exact address and signature of the sender 
whose credentials are imitated either by compromising the sender’s email or by spoofing, it is often 
difficult for the recipient to spot a phishing email.  See id. at 27–28.  
4. See generally Justin Pritchard, How Wire Transfers Work: Sending and Receiving, BALANCE 
https://www.thebalance.com/bank-wire-transfer-basics-315444 [https://perma.cc/AK3S-CB47] 
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The employee stopped, however, when she reached the last line: “This is 
extremely time-sensitive, and due to an error on my part this did not go through on 
the correct date.  If you could, please, keep this between us.”5  Although the 
company had a specific verification protocol to follow prior to a transfer of this sum, 
the employee felt that the email explained the situation and required her secrecy.6  
Following orders from her superior, the employee input the information and 
completed the transfer.7 
Only after the employee irrevocably wired $300,000 to a criminal’s bank 
account did she realize that a fraudster had spoofed the CEO’s email account and 
sent them the message.8  To make matters worse, she was not the only employee 
targeted.9  Four other new employees that received the same email also fell for the 
scheme, resulting in a combined total loss of $1.2 million.10 
Unfortunately, fraudulent schemes like the fictional scenario described here are 
on the rise and are increasingly targeting a wide range of corporations.11  Ironically, 
 
(last updated May 19, 2020) (explaining how wire transfers work).  The immutability of wire 
transfers explains why they are commonly used in fraudulent schemes.  See id.   
5. For further discussion of the various trends and schemes in social engineering fraud, see 
supra note 2. 
6. See generally Wilson, supra note 2, at 13 (“The financial institution’s employee is induced by 
email, phone or fax to wire client funds to a ‘new’ account.  Verification procedures are either 
absent or not followed, and the funds are typically unrecoverable.”). 
7. See Scott L. Schmookler & Christopher M. Kahler, Social Engineering: Is the Manipulation of 
Humans A Computer Fraud?, 22 FIDELITY L.J. 1, 15 (2016) (explaining why social engineering fraud 
schemes in which criminals impersonate employee’s superior are particularly successful).  As in the 
fictional scenario presented in the text, this article describes why these schemes can successfully 
target multiple employees in the same company.  Impersonation of a superior can “appeal[] to 
several of the unwitting participant’s emotions: credibility; fear of repercussions for failing to act; 
adherence to the corporate structure; and, sense of importance by fulfilling an important task.”  Id. 
at 16. 
8. See Jessica H. Park & John G. O’Neill, An Evolving Landscape: Insurance Coverage for Social 
Engineering Wire-Fraud Scams, 60 DRI FOR THE DEF. 70, 70–72 (2018) (detailing anatomy of social 
engineering scam).  Prior to selecting the means used to contact the target of a social engineering 
scam, criminals will typically gain information by “infiltrating company networks or other 
channels.”  Id. at 71.  In the fictitious scenario presented in the text, the criminals targeted new 
employees within the company, which is indicative of the knowledge often gained regarding the 
company’s hierarchy to select a vulnerable target.  The cited article also highlights that once a wiring 
transaction has been completed, it typically cannot be retrieved.  See id. 
9. See Katrien Anthonis, It Can Happen to You: Social Engineering in Finance, SECURELINK (Oct. 
10, 2018), https://securelink.net/en-be/insights/it-can-happen-to-you-social-engineering-in-
finance/ [https://perma.cc/HX94-M5B5] (describing test of social engineering fraud scheme).  
This article describes a security test performed on a large financial institution in Belgium, in which 
ten of the top managers were targeted through a fake social engineering scheme seeking the 
managers’ credentials.  See id.  The article highlights the ease that those performing the study were 
able to find information about the managers, their employment duties, and hobbies through “a 
simple internet search.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Astoundingly, six of the ten managers fell for the 
social engineering scheme.  See id. 
10. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7 (explaining why social engineering fraud schemes 
in which criminal impersonates employee’s superior are particularly successful). 
11. See Henry Kenyon, Hackers Increasingly Target Financial Institutions, Carbon Black Says, 
CONG. Q., Mar. 12, 2019, 2019 WL 1122058 (noting 79% of financial institutions reported an 
increase in social engineering fraud); see also Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 2–4 (illustrating 
recent increase in crimes which target humans rather than technology).  Although social engineering 
is not a new concept, “the reported number of social engineering type-schemes targeting employees 
increased by 55% in 2015 and is the leading threat to organizations.”  Schmookler & Kahler, supra 
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due to advancements in cybersecurity measures like antivirus software and malware 
protection, criminals have started to use humans to acquire funds and information 
from companies.12  These schemes surpass direct hacking methods whereby the 
hacker would gain access to information using malicious code and instead trick 
employees into giving away money or critical information in good faith.13  Such 
schemes have been categorized as “social engineering” fraud schemes.14 
Social engineering fraud schemes have enormous implications upon both the 
scope of fraudulent losses suffered by companies and the future of crime and fidelity 
insurance coverage litigation.15  An example of a social engineering fraud scheme is 
displayed in the hypothetical scenario presented above: a criminal sends a phishing 
email—“spoofed” to appear as though it is from a trusted individual—to persons 
with access to funds or with specific instructions for a transaction.  Fraudsters also 
implement these schemes through telephone calls and fax machines.16 
Currently, most companies’ crime or fidelity insurance policies only contain 
provisions for “computer fraud,” which often rely on language drafted before the 
prevalence of social engineering fraud.17  In drafting policy language, underwriters 
 
note 7, at 5 (footnote omitted). 
12. See Jennifer Towne, Social Engineering: An Old Con is Becoming a New Threat, ACADIA INS., 
https://www.acadiainsurance.com/social-engineering-fraud-old-con-becoming-new-threat/ 
[https://perma.cc/DEY6-H7PU] (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (noting that because social 
engineering preys on good-natured employees, this type of fraud is difficult to prevent and 
especially threating to businesses).  As noted by the article, “[t]here is no antivirus for this” type of 
threat.  Id.  Thus, it is especially important to have insurance to cover these types of risks because 
they are extremely difficult to avoid.  See id. 
13. See Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (explaining why fraudsters are increasingly finding it 
easier to “hack” humans rather than computers).  Due to the growing protections on computer 
systems to protect against hackers, typically the “weakest point in an organization’s security system 
is the employees themselves,” thus, explaining the increase in social engineering fraud schemes.  Id. 
14. See generally Christie M. Bird & Reina Dorvilier, Social Engineering Fraud: Current Trend in 
Coverage for Insureds, 48 SPG BRIEF 10 (2019) (providing definition for social engineering fraud).  In 
addition to classifying 2018 “as the year of the social engineering fraud claim” in the fidelity 
industry, this article provides a broad definition of social engineering fraud as “scams used by 
criminals to trick, deceive and manipulate their victims into giving out confidential information and 
funds,” which “may be carried out online, by telephone, or even in person.”  Id. at 11 (first internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
15. See Park & O’Neill, supra note 8, at 10 (detailing how social engineering fraud has evolved 
in courts and insurance coverage continues to affect businesses of all types and sizes).  Additionally, 
this article addresses the changed landscape of insurance coverage litigation, as “courts generally 
have not yet grappled with questions of coverage for social engineering losses . . . making it difficult 
to predict how potential coverage arguments under those policies will be developed and resolved.”  
Id. 
16. For further explanation of social engineering fraud schemes and the manner in which 
they are implemented, see supra notes 2–14; see also Brian Krebs, Voice Phishing Scams are Getting More 
Clever, KREBS ON SECURITY (Oct. 1, 2018, 10:02 AM), 
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/10/voice-phishing-scams-are-getting-more-clever/ 
[https://perma.cc/HS7Q-AT8U] (describing how voice phishing schemes or “vishing” are 
growing increasingly common as social engineering fraud techniques).  A common voice phishing 
scheme involves criminals from a financial institution calling and stating that fraudulent 
transactions have been made on a certain account, prompting the recipient of the call to give their 
information to confirm their identity.  See id. 
17. See Melissa M. D’Alelio, One Phish, Two Phish: Developments in the World of Computer Fraud 
Coverage, 48 SPG BRIEF 18, 19 (2019) (distinguishing “hacking” from “phishing” and explaining 
insurance policy forms for computer coverage were intended for hacking).  Furthermore, this article 
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anticipated coverage of a cybercriminal’s unauthorized and direct taking of 
information or funds by hacking a computer system.18  Therefore, the language in 
most standard policies for computer fraud strictly and plainly necessitates a “direct” 
loss due to a “fraudulent entry” into the computer system.19 
In addition to highly specific coverage language, most applicable policies 
contain exclusions that distinguish “computer fraud” from indirect methods of 
fraud or theft; for example, some policies have exclusions for losses resulting from 
data entry by an authorized “natural person,” such as an employee.20  Due to the 
involvement and necessary manipulation of an employee in social engineering fraud, 
the waters of coverage for these schemes are murky.21 
Historically, insurers and courts categorized social engineering fraud as distinct 
from losses covered under “computer fraud” provisions, leaving companies to bear 
the impact of these losses without coverage.22  Prior to 2018, the majority of courts 
held that social engineering fraud losses were not covered under insurance 
 
explains “that the purpose of the Computer Fraud Coverage Form is to cover instances where a 
perpetrator directly hacks into an insured’s computer system and fraudulently causes—by his own 
actions—a transfer of money.”  Id.  For more information regarding the modern phenomenon of 
social engineering fraud, see infra notes 38–66 and accompanying text.  To compare this to 
information regarding when the Computer Fraud Coverage Form was drafted, see infra notes 77–
81 and accompanying text. 
18. See John J. McDonald, Jr. et al., Computer Fraud and Funds Transfer Fraud Coverages, 14 
FIDELITY L.J. 109, 111–13 (2008).  This article explains that the insurance industry standard form 
for computer fraud “coverage is intended to protect against third-party access” to the computer 
system, rather than losses involving employees of the insured company.  Id. at 112.  This intent is 
evidenced by multiple exclusions added to the standard policy form since its inception.  See id. at 
113–14. 
19. See, e.g., Interactive Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929, 930 
(11th Cir. 2018) (holding social engineering losses did not “result directly” from computer fraud as 
required by plain language of insured’s policy even though losses were perpetrated through 
computers); Universal Am. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 37 N.E.3d 78, 82 
(N.Y. 2015) (holding “fraudulent entry” in insured’s policy refers to unauthorized access into 
computer system and not to content submitted by authorized users such as employees).  But see, 
e.g., Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding sending 
email manipulated to appear as though it was sent from company’s official satisfied “fraudulent 
entry” of data and, thus, social engineering scheme constituted computer fraud).  
20. See, e.g., Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 719 F. App’x 701 
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding coverage for social engineering fraud loss was precluded by policy exclusion 
for data entry “by a natural person”).  In this case, the relevant exclusion stated that computer fraud 
coverage would not apply “to loss or damages resulting directly or indirectly from the input of 
Electronic Data by a natural person having the authority to enter the Insured’s Computer System,” 
such as input by an employee.  Id. at 702. 
21. See generally Roberta Anderson, Securing Insurance for Social Engineering Exploits, 20 
TORTSOURCE 12 (2018) (explaining insurers’ resistance to concede coverage for social engineering 
fraud losses due to victim’s role in scheme).  In this article, written to provide advice to ensure that 
companies secure adequate coverage, the author warns that “[s]ocial engineering exploits present 
relatively new exposures that do not tend to fit neatly into traditional forms of coverage.”  Id. at 13.  
For a further discussion of social engineering fraud schemes and the manner in which they are 
implemented, see supra notes 2–14. 
22. See, e.g., Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 258–59 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(holding company’s social engineering losses were not covered under computer fraud provision in 
crime-protection insurance policy because employee personally authorized fraudulent transfers to 
criminal’s bank account).  In this decision, the court reasoned that even though the crime was 
initially perpetrated through an email, the email and thus use of computer was “merely incidental” 
to the transfer.  See id. at 258. 
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provisions for “computer fraud” due to courts plainly interpreting language in the 
insurance policies.23  These initial decisions denied coverage for companies and 
favored insurers under several rationales—most notably, the opinion that computer 
fraud provisions have language requiring that losses arose “directly” from the use of 
a computer.24 
By contrast, in social engineering fraud, an employee is involved in the chain of 
events that causes the losses.  Courts have historically held that the mere use of a 
computer in achieving human deception did not trigger coverage.25  The solution 
initially appeared to be a simple one: insurance underwriters could add social 
engineering coverage as either an optional or standard endorsement to the crime or 
fidelity policies insurers issue, making social engineering coverage completely 
separate from computer fraud.26  To protect against this specific type of threat, 
companies would either select a standard policy with a social engineering 
endorsement or make sure that they added this coverage to their existing policies.27 
Recently, however, several circuit courts signaled a break from precedent and 
created a circuit split over the question of whether losses from social engineering 
fraud schemes are covered under virtually identical insurance provisions for 
 
23. See Jonathan L. Schwartz & Colin B. Willmott, And Then There Was One: The Emerging Split 
Over Insurance Coverage for Social Engineering Fraud Claims, FIDELITY & SURETY COMM. NEWSL. (ABA, 
Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2018, at 17 (contrasting prior majority view with more recent decisions).  This 
analysis explains that prior to 2018, the majority of courts were “relucta[nt] to find coverage for 
social engineering fraud.”  Id.  The authors state: “[a] maxim undergirding [the majority] approach 
is that since the use of computers is ubiquitous, virtually all fraudulent conduct merely involving 
the use of email could potentially be covered.  In other words, the majority approach is wary to 
transform a computer fraud/crime policy into a general fraud policy.”  Id. 
24. For a discussion of early cases that denied coverage and favored the insurers, see cases 
cited supra notes 19–20. 
25. See Apache, 662 F. App’x at 258 (explaining that, although email was part of scheme, 
Apache employee changing account information and transferring funds leading to large financial 
loss did not trigger coverage); see also Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 
656 F. App’x 332 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding general intent of computer fraud coverage is to be limited 
to hacking incidents through unauthorized entry into computer systems).  Although Pestmaster did 
not involve an instance of social engineering fraud, a company executed an authorization to a 
payroll company for invoices.  See Pestmaster, 656 F. App’x at 333.  However, the payroll company 
kept the funds instead of paying the authorized invoices, and the lower court found and appellate 
court affirmed that the company was not covered under their policy provision for computer fraud 
because that provision would be triggered only “when someone ‘hacks’ or obtains unauthorized 
access or entry to a computer to make an unauthorized transfer or otherwise uses a computer to 
fraudulently cause a transfer of funds.”  Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 
No. 13-5039-JFW, 2014 WL 3844627, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 656 
F. App’x 332 (9th Cir. 2016). 
26. See Bird & Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (discussing insurers making social engineering 
fraud coverage available to insureds).  The authors assert that, despite this attempted solution, they 
do not believe the introduction of this coverage will deter insureds from seeking social engineering 
coverage under computer fraud provisions.  See id. 
27. See Ken Kronstadt, Insurance Coverage for Social Engineering Fraud, 33 WEST. J. CORP. 
OFFICERS & DIRS. LIAB. 2 (2018) (surveying recent court rulings for social engineering fraud under 
computer fraud provisions and providing insights for companies looking to secure coverage).  As 
the article notes, due to the prevalence of social engineering fraud schemes, there is demand for 
companies to secure coverage against these schemes.  See id.  Due to increasing demand, “some 
insurers have begun to offer policy endorsements specifically providing coverage for these claims.”  
Id.  However, insurers have added additional sublimits and exclusions to these policy provisions.  
See id. 
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“computer fraud.”28  In 2018, the Second and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals issued 
monumental decisions when they held that social engineering fraud attacks were 
covered under “computer fraud” provisions using a proximate cause standard; both 
courts found that a sufficient causal relationship existed between the use of a 
computer and the losses suffered.29  Additionally, these decisions shifted 
interpretation of various policy exclusions, such as those involving “the input of 
Electronic Data by a natural person.”30 
While the current trend favoring insureds may be appealing to some, courts 
should return to a strict interpretation of plain policy language because the loosened 
causal analyses applied in recent cases depart from the standard method of insurance 
policy interpretation.31  By restricting coverage to a plain interpretation of policy 
language, courts will promote cross-jurisdictional uniformity for the interpretation 
of the same policy language across state lines.32  Furthermore, interpretation of 
computer fraud provisions to exclude social engineering schemes will induce 
underwriters to add social engineering fraud to crime and fidelity policies, thus, 
ensuring that all companies are adequately covered for these losses, regardless of 
where their claim arises jurisdictionally.33  Finally, disentangling computers from the 
crime or activity involved will prepare the insurance litigation field for a future in 
 
28. See generally Schwartz & Willmott, supra note 23 (detailing emerging circuit split regarding 
social engineering fraud coverage and discussing impact of the rulings). 
29. See Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding 
spoofed emails proximately, and thus directly, caused social engineering fraud losses despite 
employee involvement in unfolding of scheme).  Explaining its rationale for affirming the district 
court’s holding that the company’s losses were covered under “computer fraud” provision in 
company’s insurance policy, the court stated: 
While it is true that the Medidata employees themselves had to take action to effectuate 
the transfer, we do not see their actions as sufficient to sever the causal relationship between the spoofing 
attack and the losses incurred.  The employees were acting, they believed, at the behest of a 
high-ranking member of Medidata.  And New York law does not have so strict a rule 
about intervening actors as [the insurer] argues. 
Id. at 119 (emphasis added); see also Am. Tooling Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 
F.3d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding company suffered “direct loss” that was “directly caused by 
computer fraud” when employee signed into his company’s “banking portal and manually entered 
the fraudulent banking information” sent by criminal via spoofed email). 
30. See Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 463–65 (explaining why none of policy exclusions asserted 
by insurer precluded coverage for stated claim).  In analyzing the asserted exclusions, the court 
found that several exclusions in the insured’s policy with similar provisions found applicable in 
other jurisdictions did not preclude coverage for social engineering losses: Exclusion R, which 
stated that the subject crime policy would “not apply to loss resulting directly or indirectly from 
the giving or surrendering of [m]oney . . . whether or not fraudulent”; Exclusion G, which stated 
that coverage would “not apply to loss or damages resulting directly or indirectly from the input of 
[e]lectronic [d]ata by a natural person”; and Exclusion H, which stated that the policy does not 
cover any “loss resulting directly or indirectly from forged, altered or fraudulent . . . written 
instruments.”  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Transcript of Record at 21-2, Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d 
at 463–65). 
31. For a further discussion of the circuit cases favoring the insured, see infra notes 108–24 
and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the standard method of insurance policy interpretation, 
see infra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
32. For a further discussion of how a plain interpretation of policy promotes cross-
jurisdictional uniformity, see infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
33. For a further analysis of the impact of interpreting computer fraud to exclude social 
engineering, see infra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2021], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss6/1
2020] COMMENT 7 
which technology is ubiquitous in all aspects of corporate and daily life.34 
Part II of this Comment describes common schemes used in social engineering 
fraud, provides an overview of legal standards of insurance policy interpretation, and 
summarizes the uniform rationales used by courts in addressing this issue prior to 
the circuit split which arose in 2018.  Part III of this Comment provides insight into 
the rationales implemented by courts breaking from precedent and furthering the 
current trend.  Part IV opines that the loosened standards implemented in these 
decisions will have negative effects on both insurers and insureds.  Finally, Part V 
predicts the impact of the circuit split on the numerous stakeholders involved in 
social engineering fraud. 
II. LETTING INSURERS OFF THE HOOK: PRE-CIRCUIT SPLIT CONSENSUS HOLDS 
THAT SOCIAL ENGINEERING LOSSES ARE NOT “COMPUTER FRAUD” 
Prior to the subject circuit split, the majority of courts distinguished losses 
involving the direct hacking of a computer system from those involving employee 
manipulation when determining whether insurance policies covered social 
engineering fraud.35  Because human manipulation is key to social engineering fraud, 
courts generally corroborated the notion that these losses were not covered under 
“computer fraud” provisions.36  To understand both the initial posture and the 
subsequent split, one must first understand the distinct character of social 
engineering fraud, the practices used by underwriters to draft policy language, the 
principles used by courts to interpret insurance policies, and the nature in which 
these topics shaped the view unanimously shared by courts prior to 2018.37 
A. Reeling in Employees with a Red Herring: An Overview of the Deceptive Nature of Social 
Engineering Fraud 
Social engineering is a term established long ago that encompasses a wide 
variety of schemes used by criminals to prey on human tendencies and commit 
“theft with the absence of strong-armed tactics such as violence or the threat of 
violence.”38  By one commentator’s definition, social engineering is “the act of 
 
34 For further discussion of the effects of technological developments on the insurance 
industry, see infra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
35. See, e.g., Tidewater Holdings, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D. 
Wash. 2019) (holding social engineering fraud losses not covered under computer fraud policy 
provisions) Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Alex 
Selarnick et al., Recent Developments in Insurance Coverage, 53 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 477, 478–
85 (2018) (describing recent trends in computer fraud and social engineering fraud policy 
interpretation and identifying regional trends in courts’ determination of whether coverage exists 
under policy terms). 
36. See, e.g., Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 255–59 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(asserting that policy terms required losses be “direct result” of computer fraud, rather than caused 
by actions of employees); see also Bird & Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (discussing pre-2018 majority 
view that direct entry through hacking, rather than manipulation of employees, qualifies for 
coverage under computer fraud insurance provisions). 
37. See generally Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 70 (explaining importance of analyzing 
“the nature of the social engineering scheme to determine whether the insured suffered a covered 
loss”). 
38. Id. at 6 (recognizing term “social engineering” was coined in 1894 and discussing long 
7
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influencing a person to accomplish goals that may not be in the person’s best 
interest.”39  In the modern context, social engineering is commonly used to describe 
the tactics employed by criminals to target information and funds from institutions 
or companies.40 
Typically, relevant forms of social engineering fraud fall into one of four 
categories.41  These categories include: (1) client impersonation fraud, (2) the 
executive impersonation scam, (3) the vendor impersonation scam, and (4) the law 
firm collection scam.42  Understanding the basic plots of these schemes will aid in 
understanding the factual scenarios underlying social engineering fraud claims as 
well as the dangerous threat social engineering constitutes to institutions of all 
sizes.43 
1. Client Impersonation Fraud 
In client impersonation fraud, which usually targets banks, criminals contact a 
financial institution by email, phone, or fax and impersonate a client.44  The fraudster 
then informs the targeted employee that the client has a new bank account which 
they would like their funds transferred to.45  After the employee wires the funds, the 
employee typically cannot recover or recall the completed transfer.46  These schemes 
are especially detrimental to banks because the financial institution must immediately 
compensate the real client once the fraud is discovered and then attempt to recover 
 
history of social engineering).  As the article explains, the term social engineering has been used in 
different capacities, such as to describe “the principle that government or other institutions could 
manipulate citizens to act in a desired manner or adhere to a particular political belief.”  Id.  
Furthermore, the article describes that social engineering in general “encompasses all forms of 
crime, such as the classic con game and Ponzi scheme,” positing that “[s]uch implementation of 
manipulation and persuasion is timeless.”  Id. at 6–7. 
39. Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lillian Ablon, The Outsider Threat, 
CIPHER BRIEF (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-outsider-threat 
[https://perma.cc/CG3K-4BTE].  This somewhat ominous article, penned during the early rise of 
social engineering fraud, details the potential risks involved due to such threats from outsiders 
attempting to gain access to funds or information through people, and why social engineering 
schemes are so successful due to human nature.  See id. 
40. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 7–14 (explaining how general definition of 
social engineering fraud has now become more applicable to certain sets of fraudulent activities, 
being utilized through email and phone). 
41. See Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (describing general categories into which social 
engineering fraud schemes fall and detailing varying factors which contribute to success of each). 
42. See id. (enumerating four most popular types of social engineering fraud). 
43. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 70 (stating importance of understanding nature 
and scope of these schemes to be fully cognizant of risks associated with each for insurers and 
insureds). 
44. See id. (discussing first step of client impersonation scam). 
45. See id. (explaining purported client will typically explain that they have new account and 
need their funds transferred); see also Chris Griesemer, Social Engineering: How Financial Institutions 
Can Prepare for Cyber Scams, WHITLOCK CO. BLOG, http://www.whitlockco.com/social-
engineering-financial-institutions-can-prepare-cyber-scams/ [https://perma.cc/HR8Y-TPUC] 
(explaining how “new phishing attacks can look like a legitimate customer request” with 
increasingly realistic methods). 
46. For further discussion of wire transfers and why companies or financial institutions 
cannot typically recover wire transfers after completion, see supra note 8. 
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the funds under their own crime or fidelity insurance policy.47 
2. Executive Impersonation Fraud 
Executive impersonation fraud is particularly successful when used to 
manipulate employees of larger companies with equally sizable financial 
departments.48  The perpetrator impersonates a high-ranking member of the 
company with whom the lower ranked employee likely does not have a close 
working relationship.49  The fraudster typically contacts the employee by email or 
phone in an urgent tone, enlisting the employee’s assistance with a transfer that is 
“last-minute” or “secret.”50  This scheme is ordinarily successful because the 
employee shirks authorization and security protocol in favor of obeying orders from 
a superior.51  If a criminal can closely spoof or even gain access to the true email 
account of the executive to send the fraudulent message, this scheme is especially 
difficult to spot.52 
3. Vendor Impersonation Fraud 
Vendor impersonation fraud is similar to the client impersonation scam; 
however, the criminal instead impersonates an employee of an entity that is a vendor 
of the targeted organization.53  The fraudster then states that the vendor needs to 
update its banking information.54  The fraud is usually not discovered until after the 
 
47. See generally VASCO, SOCIAL ENGINEERING: MITIGATING HUMAN RISK IN BANKING 
TRANSACTIONS 3 (2015) (ebook), https://www.onespan.com/resources/social-engineering-
mitigating-human-risk-banking-transactions-0 [permalink unavailable] (explaining in quarter 1 of 
2015, “over 37% of phishing attacks were trading on the names of banks and financial 
organizations”); see also Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (noting victim must first reimburse its client 
then seek reimbursement from its insurer). 
48. For further discussion of how and why social engineering fraudsters target companies 
with large finance departments, see supra notes 2–10. 
49. See, e.g., Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(explaining social engineering fraud method through which criminals spoofed email to employees 
to appear as though it was sent from company’s CEO). 
50. See Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 
729 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2018) (conveying factual scenario in which employees were induced to 
complete fraudulent transfer in social engineering fraud).  In the lower court decision later affirmed 
by the Second Circuit, the court explained that the targeted employees “received a group email 
purportedly sent from Medidata’s president stating: ‘I’m currently undergoing a financial operation 
in which I need you to process and approve a payment on my behalf.’”  Id. (quoting Joint Exhibit 
Stipulation Exhibit 6, Medidata, 268 F. Supp 3d at 473 (ECF No. 41)); see also Wilson et al., supra 
note 2, at 13 (explaining that, for executive impersonation fraud, the “pretext is often an emergency 
payment relating to a ‘top secret’ acquisition, merger or emergency situation”). 
51. For further discussion of the pressures upon employees to follow orders from a superior 
in both factual and fictional circumstances, see supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
52. See, e.g., Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 473 (detailing methods used by social engineering 
fraudsters to make email appear as though it was sent from company’s president in case holding 
coverage under computer fraud provision).  The court emphasized that “[t]he email contained the 
president of Medidata’s email address in the ‘From’ field and a picture next to his name,” making 
the request especially believable.  Id. 
53. See Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (describing steps taken by criminals in perpetrating 
vendor impersonation scam). 
54. See id. (explaining that in vendor impersonation scam “[t]he fraudster purports to be an 
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vendor realizes that the victim has not paid them but has instead wired money to 
the criminal’s bank account.55 
4. Law Firm Collection Fraud 
Social engineering fraud also impacts the legal profession.56  In a law firm 
collection fraud scheme, the criminal contacts a lawyer asking for assistance in 
settling a debt collection matter.57  This fake “client” then gives the lawyer fraudulent 
information for the “debtor,” who is in fact another criminal in collusion with the 
“client.”58  The lawyer then uses contact information from the “client” to collect the 
money from the “debtor.”59  The “debtor” presents the lawyer with a counterfeit 
check; subsequently, the “client” will ask for the funds collected.60  Believing that 
the check is authentic, the lawyer transfers money from the lawyer’s own trust 
account to the “client” before the check is returned as fraudulent.61 
Therefore, although these schemes often involve a computer, there are several 
different methods gaining popularity among criminals that are categorized as social 
 
employee of a legitimate vendor of the victim, and contacts the victim’s employee to request that 
the vendor’s banking information be changed”). 
55. See, e.g., Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 253–54 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(describing company’s vendor impersonation social engineering fraud claim).  In this case, Petrofac 
was a legitimate vendor of Apache.  See id.  The fraudster impersonated a representative of Petrofac 
and called an Apache employee, asking to update Petrofac’s account information for future 
transfers.  See id.  Apache transferred the funds for Petrofac’s invoices in accordance with the new 
bank information and, within a month, was notified that Pretrofac had not been paid.  See id. at 
253. 
56. See generally Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (emphasizing that lawyers are routinely 
impacted by this type of scheme and explaining “limited scope of trust account overdraft coverage 
under most lawyers’ professional liability policies”).  The article explains how, in most cases, the 
criminals will use the names of known entities to induce the lawyer to assume that this is a legitimate 
venture and ask for assistance in settling a collections matter.  See id.  It is normally after the criminal 
has told the lawyer they need a transfer of the check amount “urgently” and the lawyer completed 
a transfer from their own trust account that the lawyer realizes the check is a counterfeit.  See id.  
Because most lawyers do not have adequate trust account overdraft coverage, they must obtain 
crime or fidelity insurance policies to account for these risks.  See id. 
57. See id. (detailing steps in law firm collection fraud scheme).  Because most lawyers do not 
have adequate trust account overdraft coverage, they must obtain crime or fidelity insurance 
policies to account for these risks.  See id. 
58. See, e.g., Owens, Schine & Nicola, P.C. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 
CV095024601S, 2011 WL 3200296, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 24, 2011), vacated, 2012 WL 
12246940 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2012) (discussing claim for coverage under computer fraud 
provision in which “plaintiff entered into an agreement with the client, through the use of computer 
e-mail, to collect a debt allegedly owed to the China client from a business located in Connecticut”).  
Although this judgment was vacated by the Superior Court of Connecticut, it assists in explaining 
the nature of a law firm collection social engineering fraud scheme.  See id. 
59. See Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (describing next step in law firm collection fraud 
scheme). 
60. See Owens, 2011 WL 3200296, at *1 (explaining that “client” of attorney requested plaintiff 
to wire funds to bank in South Korea before plaintiff realized check was fraudulent). 
61. See id. (detailing that attorney victim to debt collection fraud scheme was informed that 
check was fraudulent after sending funds to client).  The court explained that the plaintiff’s bank 
“subsequently debited the plaintiff’s IOLTA account because the check from the Connecticut 
debtor that the plaintiff had deposited into his account was fraudulent.”  Id. 
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engineering fraud.62  Each involves tricking an employee into inducing the transfer 
of information or funds, preying upon human tendencies, and using an indirect 
method of taking information.63  Currently, there is no existing common law that 
interprets policy provisions specifically for social engineering fraud.64  Although 
some insurers have started to add coverage for these losses to their standard policies 
or offer it as an optional coverage addition to companies, this does not remedy the 
fact that most insureds are still dealing with crime or fidelity policies merely insuring 
against “computer fraud.”65  Therefore, when an insurance company denies an 
insured’s social engineering fraud claim and the insured then brings a claim for 
coverage against the insurer, interpretation of the policy becomes a question for 
courts.66 
B. Opening a Policy’s Can of Words: How Courts Interpret Language in Insurance Policies 
Insurance policies are elucidated by courts under state-specific common law 
standards.67  If a claim involving insurance policy interpretation reaches a federal 
court, those sitting in diversity will abide by the Erie doctrine and apply state law to 
resolve claims implicating insurance matters.68  Nevertheless, most states recognize 
uniform principles when interpreting matters of insurance law.69 
 
62. See id. (noting different methods of perpetrating social engineering fraud). 
63. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 6–21 (opining why social engineering fraud is 
becoming increasingly common as alternative to direct hacking and describing different methods 
used by fraudsters).  As posited in the article, “[r]ather than use direct attacks on a business’s 
computer system,” tricking an employee to essentially give them information, “allows the criminal 
to avoid the ‘brute force’ necessary to circumvent the technological protections a corporation may 
employ; such as firewalls and password security.”  Id. at 7–8.  As the opening to this Comment 
suggests, technology has become strong in comparison to human nature making it easier to 
manipulate humans.  See id. 
64. See Kronstadt, supra note 27 (assessing current coverage landscape where interpretation 
is focused on computer fraud provisions, with courts yet to assess coverage under social 
engineering fraud provisions).  As the article states, “courts have yet to address coverage for social 
engineering fraud under cyberliability policies, and given the lack of uniformity in policy language, 
it is difficult to predict how a court will decide coverage.”  Id. at 6. 
65. See id. (explaining that some insurers have begun to introduce social engineering fraud 
provisions to their policies).  While insurers have begun to introduce this type of coverage, the 
author warns that “[p]olicyholders should scrutinize the language of these endorsements,” because 
the insurers may have made the coverage subject to certain exclusions and sublimits.  Id. 
66. For a discussion of courts’ methods of insurance policy interpretation, see infra notes 67–
84 and accompanying text. 
67. See Provau v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting 
construction of insurance contracts is governed by substantive state law); see also 16 WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 49:14 (4th ed. 2019) (describing manner in which insurance policies are to be 
interpreted and general model rules of interpretation).  While insurance policies are interpreted as 
contracts, the nature of a policy is taken into account when courts make decisions regarding policy 
language.  See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra.  Therefore, the general policy argument is that 
ambiguities in insurance policies are to be construed against the insurer.  See id.  Nevertheless, a 
court must adhere to a plain reading of the policy language to balance this favoring of insureds with 
the necessity of insurance industry uniformity in interpreting identical policy provisions.  See id. 
68. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that when cases are 
decided in federal courts using diversity jurisdiction, courts will apply state substantive law); see also 
Russo v. Frasure, 371 F. Supp. 3d 586, 589–90 (E.D. Mo. 2018) (holding Missouri state substantive 
law applied in insurance policy claim). 
69. See generally Eric M. Larsson, Insured’s “Reasonable Expectations” as to Coverage of Insurance 
11
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Courts treat insurance policies as contracts between the insurer and insured.70  
Thus, courts apply contractual legal principles when questions of policy 
interpretation arise.71  The language used in particular types of endorsements and 
exclusions, such as those contained in commercial crime policies for “computer 
fraud,” tends to be universal in content and phrasing because it is based on standard 
forms issued by the Insurance Services Office (ISO).72 
Most insurers rely on the standard forms issued by the ISO to create their own 
policies.73  While insurers may make slight modifications to the industry-standard 
provisions, the ISO is the leading authority in the insurance industry for drafting 
legal language and providing risk assessments for insurers based upon the selected 
language.74  Therefore, insurers make an important assumption when adopting ISO 
standard forms that they can reasonably project the risks associated with each 
provision and add exclusions to further calculate, with a degree of certainty, the likely 
financial risk associated with each policy endorsement.75  Insurance policies protect 
policyholders from bearing the costs of what is arguably unforeseen; thus, it is crucial 
for insurers to have specific policy language that allows them to prepare for the 
 
Policy, 108 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS 351, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019) (surveying 
standards used by courts throughout United States in interpreting insurance policies, and 
elaborating on importance placed on contractual notion of analyzing “reasonable expectations of 
the parties” and how this affects courts’ holdings and insurance industry’s decisions in response). 
70. See Steven Plitt et al., 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:38 (3d ed. 2019) (explaining 
insurance policy “is to be given the meaning which would be attached to the contract by a 
reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all the operative usages and knowing all of the 
circumstances existing prior to and at the time of the contract”); cf. Larsson, supra note 69 
(discussing reasonable expectations in insurance policy interpretation). 
71. See, e.g., Olin Corp v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 704 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (establishing 
that, “under New York law, insurance policies are interpreted according to general rules of contract 
interpretation”).  This case was cited in the beginning of the analysis in Medidata Solutions, Inc. v. 
Federal Insurance Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 729 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 
2018); however, this notion is in accord with the insurance policy interpretation principles of each 
state, and each state’s own adoption of this principle typically is cited as the opening to a court’s 
analysis of an insurance policy when the issue arises.  See id. 
72. See McDonald et al., supra note 18, at 111 (explaining ISO’s influence in creating industry 
standard forms for different types of policy coverages and the endurance of initial language used 
in computer fraud policy form issued by ISO); see also Julie Davoren, What Does ISO Stand for in 
Insurance?, CHRON, https://smallbusiness.chron.com/iso-stand-insurance-60067.html 
[https://perma.cc/7WW5-2C72] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (explaining that ISO has been leading 
organization of its kind since its inception in 1971, and is a “principal source of information for 
insurance companies and provides comprehensive data, technical services, policy language, fraud-
identification tools, underwriting, statistical and decision-support services to numerous players such 
as the federal government, insurance industry regulators, and public- and private-sector 
customers”). 
73. See Marianne Bonner, Insurance Services Office (ISO), BALANCE SMALL BUS., 
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/insurance-services-office-iso-462706 [https://perma.cc/J343-
JRAB] (last updated May 16, 2019) (noting services and responsibilities offered by ISO and 
explaining how insurers calculate rates and risk based upon data provided by ISO). 
74. See id. (discussing prominence and importance of ISO in insurance policy formation).  
75. See id. (asserting that data and standard policy forms provided by ISO are crucial to most 
insurers when shaping their own policy forms).  As this article explains, “[i]nsurers develop rates 
based on projections of future losses,” and many insurers rely on the ISO to provide this risk data in 
conjunction with the language in their standard forms.  Id. (emphasis added); see also McDonald et 
al., supra note 18 (explaining how insurers’ utilization of ISO industry standard forms has affected 
development of “computer fraud” policy provisions and language contained therein). 
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scope of losses and to predict how courts will interpret their policy if a claim for 
coverage arises.76 
The ISO industry-standard form for “computer fraud” was introduced in 
1983.77  Although it has undergone several changes since its inception thirty-six years 
ago, it retains language that intends to cover theft carried out by “directly” taking 
information or funds through computer hacking.78  Due to the increased risks of 
technological ubiquity, any changes made to the original policy since its inception 
have narrowed the scope of coverage “to what is traditional theft . . . not a swindle 
whereby an insured is duped to depart with its money under a belief.”79  These 
exceptions are meant to prevent “computer fraud” coverage from becoming a 
general fraud provision.80  Therefore, this narrow language employed by the ISO for 
the “computer fraud” provision further supports the notion that the only losses 
anticipated by the ISO and insurers were those in which a criminal “breaks into” the 
computer system.81 
Because insurers must reasonably anticipate the risks associated with the 
language implemented in their policy provisions out of fairness to insureds that rely 
on coverage, courts identify the parties’ reasonable expectations when the policy was 
enacted.82  Additionally, when interpreting policy language, courts emphasize 
 
76. See Bonner, supra note 73 (noting that insurers view ISO forms as containing risk-
predictive language because they have been in use for decades and courts have already interpreted 
the specific words and phrases within them). 
77. See McDonald et al., supra note 18, at 111 (explaining how insurers utilize ISO industry 
standard forms has affected development of “computer fraud” policy provisions and language 
contained therein).  For further discussion of the reasonable expectations of parties to an insurance 
contract and how this affects courts’ interpretation of policy language, see supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
78. See id. (explaining ISO’s relevant form for computer fraud, “Commercial Crime policy 
(CR 00 22 05 06)”).  The standard form provides a definition for computer fraud which is included 
in almost every standard policy provision for computer fraud.  See id.  The ISO’s form provides the 
following definition: “‘Computer Fraud’ means ‘theft’ of property following and directly related to 
the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of that property from inside the ‘premises’ 
or ‘banking premises’ to a person (other than a ‘messenger’) outside those ‘premises’ or to a place 
outside those ‘premises.’”  Id. at 111–12 (second emphasis added) (quoting ISO CR 00 07 (10 90)). 
79. See id. at 111, 113–14 (detailing inception of ISO “computer fraud” standard coverage 
form).  This form has existed since 1983, which is “longer than one would likely think.”  Id. at 111.  
Although the form has undergone a few changes, “the same general concept first found in the ISO 
form seems to have survived.  The focus is on providing protection for the third-party theft of 
assets through the use of a computer.”  Id. at 112.  The article explains that changes that have been 
made have focused mostly on excluding employee actions from coverage under the policy, 
regardless of whether the actions surrounding their involvement in the loss were fraudulent.  See id. 
at 112–13. 
80. See, e.g., Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 656 F. App’x 332 
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding computer fraud coverage is limited to hacking incidents through 
unauthorized entry into computer systems, as parties could not have reasonably anticipated that 
the provision would cover losses due to authorized entry). 
81. See McDonald et al., supra note 18, at 112 (explaining exclusions included in original 
standard ISO computer fraud policy which elucidate intent of drafters and reaffirming intent of 
“direct” loss from a computer to constitute computer hacking).  
82. See generally Larsson, supra note 69 (identifying how courts determine reasonable 
expectations of parties to an insurance contract); see also McDonald et al., supra note 18, at 112 
(enumerating exclusions for computer fraud contained in original ISO policy).  The article notes 
that the exclusions in the ISO computer fraud policy form are broad, “precluding coverage 
regardless of the employee’s intent and regardless of when the employee acts.”  McDonald et al., 
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insurance policies’ unique nature and that both insurers and insureds benefit from 
cross-jurisdictional uniformity in interpreting similar provisions.83  With insurers 
issuing policies containing the same language across state lines and insureds holding 
policies that apply to differing geographical regions, many courts emphasize a policy 
argument favoring uniformity in decisions strictly interpreting policy language.84 
C. Smooth Sailing: Pre-Circuit Split Decisions Follow Plain Interpretation of Policy Language 
In earlier decisions interpreting whether coverage existed for social engineering 
fraud under computer fraud insurance provisions, courts generally adhered to 
reading the plain language of the policy at issue.85  Prior to courts’ recent trend of 
favoring coverage for insureds after social engineering fraud losses, most courts 
found that losses were not covered under the plain policy language because the 
losses either did not constitute computer fraud or the claims were precluded by a 
policy exclusion.86  The rationale in prior decisions is displayed by the Fifth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits’ holdings, which all deny “computer fraud” coverage for social 
engineering losses.87 
1. Shark in the Water: Fifth Circuit First to Address Social Engineering in Apache 
The question of whether social engineering fraud victims can recover under 
computer fraud insurance provisions first arose in the 2016 decision issued by the 
Fifth Circuit in Apache Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co.88  In this case, fraudsters 
used a vendor impersonation scam to induce Apache’s employee, through several 
 
supra note 18, at 112.  Furthermore, the article notes that the language precludes losses caused by 
inside parties and “makes clear that coverage is intended to protect against third-party access.”  Id. 
83. See Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2016) (explaining 
court’s policy goal of promoting cross-jurisdictional uniformity for methods of insurance policy 
interpretation). 
84. See id. at 255–56 (asserting policy terms requiring that fraud be “direct result” of 
computer fraud are not ambiguous).  As stated by the Apache court, “mere disagreement about the 
meaning of [an insurance policy] does not render it ambiguous,” necessitating a plain reading of 
the language.  Id. at 255. 
85. See, e.g., Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627, 629 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(holding plain language of “computer fraud” coverage provision did not provide coverage for social 
engineering fraud losses).  In this case, the policy stated that, to trigger computer fraud coverage, 
the computer fraud must have involved “(1) ‘entry into’ its computer system, and (2) ‘introduction 
of instructions’ that ‘propogate[d] themselves’ through its computer system.”  Id. (alteration in 
original).  In holding that this language clearly did not include coverage for employee manipulation 
rather than direct computer system hacking, the court concluded the company’s social engineering 
fraud losses were not covered.  See id. 
86. See, e.g., Tidewater Holdings, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 920,  
923–25 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (holding social engineering losses in which fraudulent supplemental 
funds transfer was initiated were not covered under “computer fraud” provision).  The court 
believe social engineering losses were precluded by exclusions in the main policy that were 
subdivided, such that each specific exclusion referenced the policy portion limited by it.  See id.  
While this case was issued after the circuit split at issue arose, it exemplifies the rationale instituted 
in such decisions.  See id.  For further discussion of the pre-circuit split majority view and examples 
of rationales instituted by courts in these opinions, see supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
87. For further discussion of the pre-2018 majority view and the key decisions constituting 
this view, see supra note 23–27 and accompanying text. 
88. 662 F. App’x 252 (5th Cir. 2016). 
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phone calls and emails sent from a fraudulent domain, to change the account 
information of a company vendor.89  Apache then transferred money to the new 
account and faced losses totaling $2.4 million.90  When Apache’s insurer, Great 
American, denied its claim for coverage under the “computer fraud” provision in its 
policy, Apache brought a claim against Great American.91 
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s finding of coverage for Apache 
and ruled that Great American did not owe coverage to its insured.92  In its decision, 
the court emphasized the goal of attaining cross-jurisdictional uniformity among 
courts’ interpretations of insurance policy provisions.93  In the Fifth Circuit’s view, 
the mere fact that an email was involved in the chain of events, which ultimately 
resulted in employees paying legitimate invoices to the wrong bank account, was not 
enough to trigger coverage under the computer fraud policy provision language.94 
2. Pestmaster Proves There Are More Fish in the Sea: Ninth Circuit Decides Another 
Social Engineering Fraud Claim 
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued a similar decision in Pestmaster Services, Inc. v. 
Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. of America.95  In affirming the lower court’s decision, 
the Ninth Circuit found that Pestmaster’s transfer of funds to a payroll company 
was not covered under its computer fraud policy provision for “fraudulently 
caus[ing] a transfer” when the payroll company took the money for personal gain 
without reviewing or completing invoices.96  The Ninth Circuit found that losses 
 
89. See Melissa J. Sachs, No Coverage for $2.4 Million Transfer to Criminals, 5th Circuit Court Says: 
Apache Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co., WESTLAW J. COMP. & INTERNET, Nov. 4, 2016, 
at 1–2, 2016 WL 6565858 (describing decision in Apache and factual scenario underlying case). 
90. See id. at 2 (explaining losses incurred by Apache); see also Apache, 662 F. App’x at 259 
(explaining court’s analysis of events which unfolded in social engineering fraud at issue and found 
that transfers were not covered under “computer fraud” because Apache’s employees authorized 
the transfers).  The court’s rationale was that, even though the fraud involved a computer, “the 
computer-use was but one step in Apache’s multi-step, but flawed, process that ended in its making 
required and authorized, very large invoice-payments, but to a fraudulent bank account.”  Apache, 
662 F. App’x at 259.  The court also noted the criminals’ use of a phone in the scheme, and that 
their use of a computer to further defraud the company “was in response to Apache’s refusing, 
during the telephone call, to . . . transcribe the change-request.”  Id.  Therefore, while the court 
acknowledged that contacting Apache by email through a computer was successful, the court noted 
that the transfer occurred “only because, after receiving the email, Apache failed to investigate 
accurately the new, but fraudulent, information provided to it.”  Id.  Apache elected to pay legitimate 
invoices, but to the wrong bank account; therefore, “the invoices, not the email” caused the losses.  
Id. 
91. Id. at 254 (stating Apache’s claim for coverage due to insurer’s denial of coverage for 
social engineering fraud claim under “computer fraud” provision). 
92. See id. at 253, 259 (vacating district court decision and finding no coverage for claim at 
issue). 
93. See id. (noting interest in maintaining cross-jurisdictional uniformity and declining to 
extend coverage because the transfer was not directly caused by use of computer). 
94. See id. at 259 (emphasizing transfer was not caused by computer fraud as covered by 
policy, but by actions of Apache employees). 
95. 656 F. App’x 332 (9th Cir. 2016). 
96. Id. at 333 (explaining that “Computer Fraud” provision does not cover authorized 
transactions).  The court in Pestmaster stated: 
We interpret the phrase “fraudulently cause a transfer” to require an unauthorized 
transfer of funds.  When Priority 1 transferred funds pursuant to authorization from 
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covered under computer fraud require an unauthorized transfer due to hacking; here, 
the court found that, although the claims were fraudulent, the use of the system by 
authorized users did not trigger coverage.97  As in Apache, the Ninth Circuit found 
that the use of a computer in a scheme was not sufficient to bring the claim into the 
scope of the computer fraud provision.98  This decision was echoed two years later 
when the Ninth Circuit found that a company’s social engineering losses due to a 
vendor impersonation scheme were not covered in Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers 
Casualty & Surety Co. of America.99 
3. Running a Tight Ship: Eleventh Circuit Solidifies Narrow Interpretation of Computer 
Fraud Provisions in Interactive Communications 
Only a month after the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Aqua Star, the Eleventh 
Circuit issued a similar opinion in Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Great 
American Insurance Co.100  Interactive Communications (InComm) is a company that 
sells “chits” to consumers, which involves putting money onto reloadable debit 
cards issued by an external financial institution.101  Fraudsters, realizing that 
 
Pestmaster, the transfer was not fraudulently caused.  Because computers are used in 
almost every business transaction, reading this provision to cover all transfers that 
involve both a computer and fraud at some point in the transaction would convert this 
Crime Policy into a “General Fraud” Policy.  While Travelers could have drafted this 
language more narrowly, we believe protection against all fraud is not what was intended 
by this provision, and not what Pestmaster could reasonably have expected this 
provision to cover. 
Id. 
97. See id. (explaining why incident is not covered here and noting broader interpretation of 
computer fraud converts provision into general fraud policy). 
98. See id. (explaining why claim is not covered in this case); see also Apache, 662 F. App’x at 
258 (finding use of computer to be “merely incidental” and fraudulent events not “directly by the 
computer use”). 
99. 719 F. App’x 701 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that an exclusion for input of electronic data 
by a natural person excluded coverage for social engineering fraud losses).  In Aqua Star, the court’s 
decision largely hinged on interpretation of an exclusion meant to limit coverage for computer 
fraud, and held that the exclusion at issue “unambiguously provides that the policy ‘will not apply 
to loss or damages resulting directly or indirectly from the input of Electronic Data by a natural 
person having the authority to enter the Insured’s Computer System’”; therefore, because the 
employees were authorized to change the information and authorize the four wires, their “conduct 
fits squarely within the [e]xclusion.”  Id. at 702.  The court noted that other exclusions “may also 
bar coverage,” but did not proceed with further analysis of other exclusions.  Id. 
100. 731 F. App’x 929 (11th Cir. 2018). 
101. See id. at 931–32 (explaining facts giving rise to claim and stating that social engineering 
fraud losses were not “direct”).  When analyzing directness, the court stated: 
What does it mean for a result to follow a cause “directly”?  Common-language and 
legal dictionaries provide a clear (and essentially the same) answer.  Webster’s Second, for 
instance, defines “direct” to mean “(1) straight; proceeding from one point to another 
in time or space without deviation or interruption; not crooked or oblique . . . ; (2) 
Straightforward; going straight to the point . . . ; (3) Immediate; marked by the absence 
of an intervening agency or influence; making contact or effected without an 
intermediary[.]” . . .  
 
The theme is unmistakable.  In accordance with the term’s ordinary meaning, we hold 
that, for purposes of InComm’s policy, one thing results “directly” from another if it 
follows straightaway, immediately, and without any intervention or interruption. 
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InComm’s computerized voice recognition phone system allowed the redemption 
of one single chit multiple times, initiated duplicate instructions for the financial 
institution to authorize transfers to debit cards, which caused InComm to incur over 
$11 million in losses.102  While the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s 
determination that the fraud did not involve computer use, it affirmed the lower 
court’s holding that the losses incurred did not “result[] directly” from the use of the 
computer system.103 
In this determination, the court stated that “one thing results ‘directly’ from 
another if it follows straightaway, immediately, and without any intervention or 
interruption.”104  Because InComm authorized the transfers to the financial 
institution following the call, the court could not say the losses resulted directly from 
the use of a computer.105  By plainly reading the policy language, the court reached 
an interpretation that matched the underwriters’ intent for the coverage provision, 
namely, to cover only direct theft and to exclude employees’ intervening acts.106  In 
the years following these decisions, other circuits followed this rationale either by 
finding that social engineering fraud did not trigger computer fraud coverage or that 
policy exclusions applied.107 
 
Id. at 934 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
102. See id. at 931 (explaining fraudulent activity and noting losses).  The court continued its 
analysis by outlining each step in the social engineering fraud scheme to determine whether the loss 
resulted “directly” from the use of computers.  Id. at 934.  First, the fraudsters manipulated 
InComm’s system to enable a duplicate chit redemption where, for each redeemed chit, “a 
fraudster’s debit card is immediately credited with purchasing power, but InComm’s funds are 
neither transferred, nor disturbed, nor altered in any way.”  Id.  Second, InComm transferred money 
corresponding to the redeemed chits to a bank account, where the money remained until “needed 
to cover purchases made on a consumer’s debit card.”  Id.  Third, the fraudsters used the debit card 
to make purchases, which incurred a debt from the bank account.  Id. at 934–35.  Fourth, the bank 
transfers money from the account to the merchant.  Id. at 935.  InComm argued that its losses 
occurred in the second step when it transferred money to the account; however, the court held:  
Accordingly, InComm’s loss did not occur with the Step-2 transfer of funds to the account held by 
Bancorp.  Rather, the loss did not occur until—at Step 4—Bancorp actually disbursed money from the 
InComm-earmarked account to pay merchants for purchases made by cardholders.  That was the 
point at which InComm could not recover its money.  That was the point of no return. 
Id. at 935 (emphasis added). 
103. See id. at 933–35 (holding that, although social engineering claim constituted “use of a[] 
computer” under the policy language, the losses did not result “directly” from computer fraud, as 
required by policy (alteration in original)). 
104. Id. at 934 (stating that “if the phrase ‘resulting directly’ has a ‘common signification’—
i.e., an ordinary meaning—then we have to find and enforce it”).  In its decision, the Eleventh 
Circuit explained that it is “a fundamental principle of Georgia law—and law more generally—that 
words in contracts ‘generally bear their usual and common signification[.]’”  Id. at 933–34 (alteration 
in original) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(2) (2019)). 
105. See id. at 935 (holding employees’ presence as intervening act and lack of immediacy 
precluded claim for coverage because losses were not caused “directly” by computer fraud). 
106. See id. at 933–35 (explaining rationale for policy interpretation and finding that intent of 
“direct” in policy language required greater immediacy than indirect causation due to computer 
fraud). 
107. See generally Kronstadt, supra note 27 (reviewing decisions comprising pre-2018 majority 
view and discussing courts rationales in making these decisions).  While acknowledging that the 
majority of courts making social engineering fraud coverage determinations under computer fraud 
provision language have “favored insurers,” the author notes that the decisions have an “impact 
on a company’s bottom line.”  See id. 
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III. SIT DOWN, YOU’RE ROCKING THE BOAT: A CIRCUIT SPLIT EMERGES 
The judicial notion that social engineering fraud schemes and the losses 
incurred by their perpetrators are not covered under insurance provisions for 
computer fraud was seemingly solidified in courts throughout the United States prior 
to 2018.108  Nevertheless, several 2018 decisions issued by the Second and Sixth 
Circuits turned the tide in the insured’s favor.109  These cases both determined that 
social engineering fraud schemes were covered under insurance provisions for 
computer fraud. 
A. A Fish Out of Water: The Second Circuit Decision for Coverage in Medidata 
On July 6, 2018, the Second Circuit decided Medidata Solutions, Inc. v. Federal 
Insurance Co.110  This case departed from prior decisions in other circuits.111  In its 
holding, the Second Circuit broadly interpreted the policy term “direct” in reference 
to the insured’s computer fraud policy provision and found coverage for a social 
engineering fraud claim.112  Here, criminals formatted an email to appear as though 
it was from the corporation’s (Medidata’s) president to induce a transfer to the 
fraudsters’ account.113  In affirming the holding issued by the district court, the 
Second Circuit held that this email was a “violation of the integrity of the computer 
system,” even though the criminals did not directly access Medidata’s server to send 
the email to employees.114  While the finance department personnel actually 
transferred the funds, the Second Circuit held that the spoofed emails were the 
proximate cause of the transfers.115 
 
108. See Schwartz & Willmott, supra note 23, at 2 (describing emerging circuit split over 
coverage determinations for social engineering fraud in light of prior decisions from other circuits). 
109. See generally Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2018); Am. 
Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2018).  For further 
explanation of how these decisions subverted from the pre-2018 consensus, see infra notes 110–24 
and accompanying text. 
110. 729 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2018).  
111. See Michael S. Levine & Latosha M. Ellis, Year in Review: Top Insurance Cases of 2018,  
WESTLAW J. ENVTL., Feb. 27, 2019, 2019 WL 615838 (discussing Second Circuit’s decision in 
Medidata and its potential impact on insurance coverage litigation landscape).  In this article, the 
authors describe Medidata as “one of the most closely watched social engineering cases,” affirming 
the lower court’s decision to find coverage.  Id.  For further discussion of Medidata and the how it 
diverted from the majority of courts’ determinations in finding coverage under a computer fraud 
policy provision for a social engineering fraud loss, see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
112. See Medidata, 729 F. App’x at 118–19 (holding that, under de novo review, fraudster 
changing appearance of email to impersonate high ranking superior in company constituted 
“violation of the integrity of the computer system” (quoting Universal Am. Corp. v. Nat’l Union 
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 37 N.E.3d 78, 81 (N.Y. 2015)).  Furthermore, the Second Circuit 
instituted a proximate cause standard and found that the lower court erred in its determination that 
coverage for the social engineering fraud claim was improper because the “direct” policy language 
allowed an instance like this, in which a computer proximately caused the chain of events giving 
rise to the losses, even though the employees themselves effectuated the transfer.  See id. at 119. 
113. See id. at 118 (describing executive impersonation scheme used by criminals). 
114. See id. at 118–19. 
115. See id. (explaining proximate cause of losses and holding that “New York law does not 
have so strict a rule about intervening actors” to find that social engineering losses were not direct 
loss). 
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B. Hook, Line, and Sinker: The Sixth Circuit Reinforces the Trend in American Tooling 
Only one week later on July 13, 2018, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed a district court ruling in favor of an insurer in a social engineering fraud 
claim to find coverage in American Tooling Center, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. 
of America.116  In deciding this case, the court weighed in on the circuit split, deciding 
that a vendor impersonation scam was covered under computer fraud.117  The Sixth 
Circuit held that various exclusions, which barred coverage in other jurisdictions, 
did not preclude coverage for the social engineering fraud scheme.118 
Although the court acknowledged the paucity of Michigan law dealing with 
interpretation of “direct,” the court adopted the notion that a “direct” loss is one 
resulting from an “immediate or proximate” cause.119  The court contended that “[i]f 
[the insurer] had wished to limit the definition of computer fraud . . . it could have 
done so.”120  Yet, the court quickly dismissed the assertions that several other policy 
exclusions were the insurer’s way of limiting the computer fraud policy.121 
Despite the tide shifting to find coverage for insureds suffering from social 
engineering fraud losses under computer fraud provisions, the Ninth Circuit has 
declined to follow Medidata and American Tooling in subsequently issued opinions 
dealing with social engineering fraud.122  Nevertheless, decisions recently issued in 
 
116. 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining holding of court to find that social engineering 
fraud scheme fit within policy’s computer fraud provision). 
117. See id. at 465 (holding that social engineering loss “is covered by the Policy and none of 
the asserted Policy exclusions apply”). 
118. See id. at 463–65 (reversing district court’s decision and holding that company suffered 
“direct loss”, scheme constituted computer fraud under policy, and policy exclusions did not apply 
here even though some policy exclusions had decisively precluded coverage in other circuits).  For 
further discussion of the policy exclusions relevant to American Tooling and the court’s rationale in 
holding that the policy exclusions did not apply, see supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
119. See Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 460, 463 (emphasis added) (declining to accept insurer’s 
argument in brief that, under established Michigan law applicable to interpretation of word “direct” 
in context of employee-fidelity bonds, court should apply narrower definition).  Although the court 
acknowledged the scarcity of Michigan law dealing with interpretation of the word “direct,” it noted 
that the insurer supported its brief with a plethora of cases interpreting “direct” in the context of 
employee-fidelity bonds.  See id.  These cases applied a narrower definition of “direct,” and the 
court posited that the lower court’s decision, which granted summary judgment in favor of insureds, 
is based upon interpretation of “direct” in this precise context.  See id.  Instead, the court cited to 
an unpublished opinion and instituted the court’s definition of “direct” as signaling “immediate” 
or “proximate.”  See id. at 460 (citing Acorn Inv. Co. v. Mich. Basic Prop. Ins. Ass’n, No. 284234, 
2009 WL 2952677, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009).  The court then concluded that the 
company “immediately lost its money when it transferred the approximately $834,000 to the 
impersonator; there was no intervening event.”  Id. 
120. Id. at 462 (opining that insurer’s “attempt to limit the definition of ‘Computer Fraud’ 
to hacking and similar behaviors in which a nefarious party somehow gains access to and/or 
controls the insured’s computer is not well-founded”). 
121. For further discussion of the American Tooling policy exclusions that the court found 
were not applicable to preclude coverage, see supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
122. See Tidewater Holdings, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D. 
Wash. 2019) (holding social engineering fraud losses not covered under computer fraud policy 
provisions); see also Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(holding, unlike the Ninth Circuit, that social engineering losses were covered under “computer 
fraud” provision); Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 465 (holding social engineering losses were not 
precluded by various exclusions to “computer fraud” provision). 
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district courts indicate a growing preference toward a looser standard in interpreting 
“computer fraud” provisions.123  The impact of these decisions, not only upon social 
engineering fraud losses but also upon interpretation of “direct” language in 
insurance policies, will become clear as insurers and insureds react to the opinions.124 
IV. DON’T TAKE THE BAIT: WHY THE TREND TOWARD COVERAGE FOR 
INSUREDS DOES NOT SOLVE THE ISSUE 
Courts should discontinue the current trend toward finding coverage for 
insureds suffering from social engineering fraud losses under computer fraud policy 
provisions because the loosened proximate cause analysis in these cases departs 
from the standard method of insurance policy interpretation.125  Because social 
engineering presents an entirely different and more complicated threat, courts 
should allow insurance companies to provide separate coverage for social 
engineering.126  This will allow insurers to appropriately assess the monetary risks of 
social engineering claims and will allow insureds to be confidently protected against 
these schemes without legal ambiguity.127 
Both Mediata and American Tooling strained to shoehorn social engineering 
coverage within computer fraud provisions, abandoning precedential methods of 
insurance policy interpretation.128  First, the court in Medidata interpreted the 
criminals’ spoofing and email formatting to appear as though it was sent from 
 
123. See generally Childrens Place, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 181-1963 (ES) (JAD), 2019 
WL 1857118, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss due to factual issue of 
whether hacker’s activities could be interpreted as infiltration pursuant to policy language and 
because denying coverage would produce absurd result).  But see Tidewater Holdings, 389 F. Supp. 3d 
at 925 (holding that social engineering losses where fraudulent supplemental funds transfer was 
initiated were not covered under “computer fraud” provision and were precluded by original 
exclusions in main policy, which were subdivided so each specific exclusion referenced limited 
policy portion). 
124. See generally Joshua Dobiac, I Came, I Saw, I Underwrote: D & O Liability Insurance’s Past 
Underwriting Practices and Potential Future Directions, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 487 (2008) (explaining 
underwriting process and how underwriters assess risk).  Though this article deals particularly with 
Directors & Officers liability insurance, it provides an excellent explanation of the cycle insurance 
writers go through to constantly assess risk and update their policies.  See id. at 495–96.  To assess 
risk and update polices, insurance writers look to court decisions and legal trends to determine the 
risk factors associated with specific policy provisions.  See id. at 488–89. 
125. See generally Park & O’Neill, supra note 8 (describing shift in new court decisions that 
interpret identical policy provisions in different manners).  In this article, the authors compare the 
various pre-Medidata decisions, post-Medidata decisions, and policy language with each other and 
continually come to the same conclusion: “court[s] examining similar policy language . . . come to 
a different conclusion.”  Id. at 8.  Therefore, at this point in time, there is an inherent inconsistency 
in social engineering fraud loss interpretations under computer fraud policy provisions.  See id. at 
4–5 (noting various interpretations of provisions). 
126. See Bird & Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (discussing insurers making social engineering 
fraud coverage available to insureds).  For more information regarding the methods criminals use 
to carry out social engineering fraud schemes and how they differ from hacking methods, see supra 
notes 38–66. 
127. For further discussion of how companies may deem adding social engineering fraud 
coverage as premature in light of the subject legal trend and therefore avoid creating separate policy 
provisions, see infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
128. For further discussion of why these cases diverged from the typical method of narrow 
insurance policy interpretation, see infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text. 
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Medidata’s president to constitute “fraudulent entry of data or deletion of data from 
a computer system.”129  Despite the fact that this provision clearly denotes direct 
taking by hacking, the court’s finding that merely receiving an email with a deceptive 
address satisfies this definition demonstrates a misconception of what traditionally 
constitutes a computer system breach.130  Even if the fraudsters had gained access to 
the email server to communicate the fraudulent instructions, the monetary losses 
would still not have stemmed directly from this “entry”; instead, this provision 
contemplates, in light of previously discussed ISO language, the entry or deletion of 
data which on its own causes the loss, rather than an employee completing the 
process.131 
Immediately after Medidata, the Sixth Circuit held similarly in American Tooling.132  
By basing its definition of “direct” upon an unpublished opinion and passing over 
jurisprudence in Michigan that clearly found “direct” to denote “immediate,” the 
Sixth Circuit broadly interpreted “direct” beyond its plain and common meaning.133  
Furthermore, by opining that “[i]f [the insurer] had wished to limit the definition of 
computer fraud to [hacking] it could have done so,” the Sixth Circuit discounted the 
history of computer fraud coverage language.134  Additionally, the court overlooked 
underwriters’ inability to anticipate the recent rise of social engineering; in other 
 
129. See Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(describing method through which criminals changed email format and courts’ interpretation of 
this practice as hacking computer system).  Although changing the email format or making it appear 
a certain way necessarily involves coding, the court categorized this practice as computer hacking 
in opposition to other courts’ decisions.  See id.  In finding that the email spoofing caused a change 
to Medidata’s computer system, the district court elaborated: 
[T]he thief constructed messages in Internet Message Format (“IMF”) which the parties 
compare to a physical letter containing a return address.  The IMF message was 
transmitted to Gmail in an electronic envelope called a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(“SMTP”).  Much like a physical envelope, the SMTP Envelope contained a recipient 
and a return address.  To mask the true origin of the spoofed emails, the thief embedded a 
computer code. 
Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 729 F. App’x 
117 (2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  The court therefore equated this 
“computer code” to change the email format with hacking.  See id. 
130. Compare Interactive Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929, 932 
(11th Cir. 2018) with Medidata, 729 F. App’x at 117.  The Eleventh Circuit stated: “[t]he question is 
whether the fraudsters ‘use[d]’ both phones and computers to perpetrate their scheme—namely, 
using the phones to manipulate—and thereby use—the IVR computers.”  Interactive Commc’ns, 731 
F. App’x at 932.  Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit, like other courts, found that manipulation of the 
computer is crucial to a computer fraud claim.  See id. 
131. For further discussion of the ISO and the coverage contemplated in drafting the ISO’s 
standard policy language for “computer fraud,” see supra notes 73–84 and accompanying text. 
132. See Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 
2018) (finding American Tooling Center experienced “direct loss”); cf. Direct, WEBSTER’S NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939) (defining “direct” as “marked by the absence of an 
intervening agency or influence”). 
133. See Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 459–61 (explaining “direct” word interpretation); see also 
Acorn Inv. Co. v. Mich. Basic Prop. Ins. Ass’n, No. 284234, 2009 WL 2952677, at *2 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Sept. 15, 2009) (defining “direct” as “immediate”).  For further discussion of “direct” 
interpretation under its plain and common meaning, see supra notes 85–104. 
134. See Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 462 (explaining why policy should be read to include 
situation at issue).  For a further discussion of the history of the computer fraud coverage form and 
the various exclusions that have been added since its inception to accommodate and specify 
coverage, see supra notes 67–78 and accompanying text. 
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words, the underwriters could not have anticipated the need to distinguish terms 
within computer fraud provisions from aspects of social engineering fraud because 
these risks were not contemplated—or were not sufficiently prevalent to warrant 
consideration—during the policy’s drafting.135 
Courts must respect the insurance policy’s unique nature because there is a 
strong policy argument for preserving underwriting techniques and respecting the 
relevant markets available for insurers to create different coverage for distinct types 
of risks.136  The insurer’s reasonable expectations are largely based on projections 
and statistics surrounding policy language to determine their risk level.137  Thus, the 
recent expansion of terms like “direct,” coupled with courts’ disregard of clear 
exclusion language, will make it difficult for insurers to accurately determine rates 
for coverage as well as fund allocation for riskier provisions.138 
By keeping social engineering fraud distinct from losses arising directly from a 
computer, courts will induce underwriters to add separate social engineering fraud 
coverage to crime and fidelity policies.139  In turn, companies who want to protect 
against this type of crime will have the assurance of coverage.140  Due to the 
 
135. For further discussion of the importance of insurance providers anticipating the risks 
associated with their policies and how courts evaluate the reasonable expectations of the insurer 
and insured, see supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
136. See generally Larsson, supra note 69 (describing how courts assess reasonable expectations 
of insurer, especially out of respect for unique nature of  insurance market).  Although it should 
not be the policy argument guiding already issued insurance policies, there is a market for insurers 
to include or give companies the option of social engineering fraud coverage.  See id.  As these 
losses grow increasingly larger, and arguably could surpass the average loss amounts of those merely 
from computer fraud due to hacking, insurers should have the right to distinguish computer fraud 
coverage from social engineering fraud coverage.  See id.  Other commentators argue the trend 
toward providing coverage for social engineering fraud losses under computer fraud provisions 
“undermines insurers’ interest in uniformity in the meaning of their policy forms.”  Bird & 
Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (warning insurers may see these newer decisions as reason to “rewrite 
the computer fraud provisions to explicitly limit coverage to attacks on the insured’s computer 
system itself”). 
137. For further discussion of how insurers calculate risk and draft policies accordingly, see 
supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
138. See generally Dobiac, supra note 124, at 495 (describing underwriting cycle of assessing 
risk).  The author explains the underwriting cycle and how underwriters assess risk in selecting 
policy drafting language.  See id. 
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018) (displaying preeminence of traditional approach to 
“computer fraud” as third-party accessing information through hacking, as it does not include 
activities that could be considered social engineering, and therefore coverage for this would need 
to be added separately into policies).  This federal statute focuses on incriminating fraud and related 
activity regarding computers.  See id.  The statute’s language echoes the pre-2018 majority stance 
on whether social engineering fraud constitutes computer fraud and gives a definite answer: no.  
See id.  In pertinent part, the computer fraud statute forbids one from  “knowingly and with intent 
to defraud, access[ing] a protected computer without authorization;” therefore, the statute would 
not apply to the authorized transactions involved in social engineering fraud schemes.  Id. §§ (a)(2)–
(4).  To constitute federal criminal computer fraud, one must obtain access to a computer without 
authorization.  See id.  Arguably, in social engineering fraud schemes, the perpetrator’s goal is not 
to access the computer and obtain information independently without the involvement of an 
employee.  See id.  While this statute is not binding on courts’ interpretations of the policy language 
found in insurance policies, this statute establishes that a common understanding of computer 
fraud necessitates hacking and does not include social engineering.  See id. 
140. See id. § (e)(1) (defining “computer” under statute favorable to insurance policies 
looking to clarify coverage).  The United States Code provides the following definition of 
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ambiguity created by courts loosening the standards used to interpret insurance 
policies, these decisions, which seemingly benefit insureds, may ultimately create 
more harm than good.141 
V. BIGGER FISH TO FRY: THE POTENTIAL UNFORESEEN IMPACTS OF THE 
CURRENT TREND TOWARD COVERAGE 
Although policy underwriters are adding social engineering fraud provisions to 
insurers’ standard crime and fidelity policies, companies will likely find that adding 
this coverage to their policies is premature in light of the trending decisions favoring 
insureds and affording them social engineering coverage under existing computer 
fraud provisions.142  Believing themselves to be protected under their current 
policies, companies may elect to forego additional coverage options that specifically 
deal with social engineering fraud.143  Yet, if the claim is litigated in a court that 
adheres to narrower insurance policy interpretation methods or the social 
engineering fraud is instigated by phone, fax, or an in-person interaction, the insured 
will be left defenseless.144  Furthermore, a lack of legal uniformity for businesses 
 
“computer” within the meaning of the statute as it relates to fraudulent criminal activities: 
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing 
device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage 
facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with 
such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a 
portable hand held calculator, or other similar device[.] 
Id.; see also John R. Felice, The Computer Crime Coverage Conundrum, HERMES NETBURN (2013), 
https://www.hermesnetburn.com/E40D62/assets/ files/News/JRF-
The%20Computer%20Crime%20Coverage%20Conundrum.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FEK-
PEFA] (noting that, because technology is constantly evolving, insureds may not have full coverage 
under computer fraud provisions).  In this paper, the author deals with the problem of identifying 
what, precisely, constitutes a computer.  See id.  Even if the court agrees with the notion that 
computer fraud denotes hacking, the author questions whether an employee’s hacked smartphone 
that gives away information or funds to a criminal, for example, constitute computer fraud.  See id.  
The author posits that this difficult question will, until insurers more clearly define coverage and 
distinguish between different types of fraud, “continue to present challenges that can be overcome 
by the addition of definitions establishing the scope of the coverage provided.  Until such time, the 
arguments for and against finding a covered loss resulting from ‘use of a computer’ remain as broad 
as the imagination will allow.”  Id. 
141. See Bird & Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (stating that in response to more lenient 
coverage decisions, few newer social engineering provisions written by insurers have come with 
various exclusions and will likely not limit continuance of such claims under provisions for 
computer fraud).  As stated by the authors, due to the circuit split, they “do not foresee the 
availability of social engineering fraud coverage deterring insureds from making claims for 
computer fraud coverage.”  Id. at 16.  Therefore, coverage under computer fraud policies will 
remain an important issue until the circuit split is resolved.  See id. at 17. 
142. See id. at 16 (explaining impact recent court decisions will likely have on insurance 
policies).  As previously discussed, companies will likely abstain from taking further precautions to 
insure themselves against these types of losses if they have computer fraud coverage, as the circuit 
split and trend toward coverage suggests that changing their policy or purchasing extra social 
engineering coverage may be premature.  See id. 
143. See Selarnick et al., supra note 35, at 483–84 (noting that, while companies should take 
precautions, social engineering fraud interpretation under existing policy provisions is developing 
field of litigation that companies should consider when negotiating policy provisions). 
144. For further discussion of cases in which courts found coverage was precluded for social 
engineering losses under “computer fraud” provisions, see supra notes 79–102 and accompanying 
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working across state lines will make it difficult for companies to select adequate 
crime and fidelity insurance coverage.145 
Additionally, cases interpreting the meticulously worded coverage provisions in 
all types of policies may look at the more lenient decisions and expand coverage 
beyond the enumerated terms.146  Courts already have begun to cite these cases and 
their loosened policy language interpretation in subsequent decisions.147  While these 
decisions have and will continue to change the insurance coverage litigation 
landscape, they especially will affect claims implicating technology.148  As technology 
becomes ubiquitous, it is extremely important for courts to extract the nature of the 
crime or legal action at issue from the technology used.149  In doing so, insurers will 
have the freedom to develop and adapt policy language to account for an 
increasingly virtual world.150 
 
text. 
145. For further discussion of how courts’ interpretation of insurance policies affects 
businesses, see supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
146. See Selarnick et al., supra note 35, at 485 (explaining efficient proximate cause doctrine, 
which applies to losses resulting from both covered and uncovered causes).  By expanding “direct” 
to a proximate cause standard, and without seeking guidance from legal doctrines applying a 
proximate cause standard in insurance policy provisions, courts bypass rhetorical methods used to 
comb through murky proximate cause issues; this may now be relevant as insurers may narrow 
coverage and social engineering losses may be categorized as caused by both a covered and 
uncovered type of loss.  See id. 
147. See, e.g., Childrens Place, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 18-11963 (ES) (JAD), 2019 
WL 1857118, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss because court found that 
whether hacker’s activities could be interpreted as infiltration pursuant to policy language was 
factual issue and therefore denying coverage would produce an absurd result). 
148. See David Hollander, Position of Influence, Beyond Traditional Roles, INS. & TECH., Nov. 
2012, at 11, https://dsimg.ubm-us.net/envelope/282372/477953/insurance-technology-
november-2012-elite-8_2780398.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FKA-9XCN] (stating that “the demand 
for technology-enabled change throughout the [insurance] business has never been greater”). 
149. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7 (questioning whether manipulation of humans, 
as is carried out through social engineering schemes, constitutes computer fraud).  As is detailed in 
their article, social engineering fraud is nothing new.  See id. at 4.  This extremely general fraud 
category preys upon human emotions and favors human weaknesses to gain access to information 
and funds.  See id. at 5.  The article acknowledges that “[t]he growing use of technology-enabled 
processes exposes a wide variety of businesses to cybercrime[,]” and technology is merely a means 
of achieving that crime; one example is identity theft.  Id. at 1.  However, the focus should be on 
the direct nature of these crimes through the computer, as they are extremely different from 
schemes requiring employee involvement.  See id. at 40. 
150. See generally Doug Bonderud, The Evolution of Technology: From Unusual to Ubiquitous, 
PROGRESS (June 20, 2016), https://blog.ipswitch.com/evolution-technology-unusual-ubiquitous 
[https://perma.cc/R88P-TTWR] (detailing technology’s ubiquity in modern life and how this 
notion will only increase over time). 
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